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Abstract—The ability to fuse data from heterogeneous sources
(such as Smart Meters etc.) in the low-voltage grid highly depends
on the communication and data management infrastructure
that allows an exchange of information between different grid
assets. Failure or any attempt to attack this data fusion solution
can lead to inefficient grid operation and in worst case even
blackouts. Therefore, this paper describes methodologies to cope
with threats and faults in a low-voltage grid scenario to provide
resilient access to the heterogeneous measurement data.
Keywords-Grid Observability; Resilient data access; Smart
Grid Data Integration; HAZOP; Threat Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolving decentralized power system has led to a huge
penetration of renewable energy sources such as wind and
photovoltaic generation. Such energy resources are distributed
across medium voltage and low voltage (LV) grids and have
volatile power production. This brings new challenges for
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) for grid efficiency
and voltage quality [1]. However, grid-connected systems use
inverters that provide opportunities including provision of new
measurement points that to a large extent are already connected
to Internet portals of the inverter vendors. Moreover, the mas-
sive deployment of Smart Meters (SM) provides opportunities
for DSOs to obtain valuable information about the LV grid.
In order to achieve observability of LV grids, the data
from the SMs, inverters and other measurement devices need
to be correlated to the LV grid topology. However, fusing
heterogeneous data provides multiple challenges [2], including
vulnerabilities associated with the use of existing communica-
tion networks and information systems that may be exploited
for financial or political motivation to delay, block, alter
process related information (with fraudulent information) or
even direct cyber-attacks against the power system. In either
case, this will affect the integrity, confidentiality or availability
of the ICT system [3], which can lead to an inefficient
grid operation and in worst case to blackouts. Therefore,
algorithmic solutions as well as connectivity and security from
an ICT perspective need to be designed carefully and strategies
should be defined to cope with potential associated risks.
The control and security of power systems using existing
communication networks for control purposes has been tackled
in several works. Authors of [4] analyze end-to-end security
of the communication between DSO substation and distributed
energy resources over heterogeneous networks through TLS
encryption and authentication compliant to IEC 62351-3. [5]
describes a solution to use standardized technologies to allow
secure communications for ancillary services with minimal
configuration by corporate networks administrators. Similarly,
[3] focuses on medium voltage grids characterized by a high
level penetration of renewable generation plants and examines
the risks associated with communication malfunctions of an
ICT architecture implementing the voltage control function.
This paper summarizes a data fusion architecture developed
for LV grid observability applications, presents an analysis of
threats and hazards applied to the ICT architecture as case
study and selected analysis results, together with directions to
follow up in research and system design as consequence.
II. GRID OBSERVABILITY - SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Data fusion from different heterogeneous data sources (e.g.,
SMs, inverters) in LV grids can add value to the DSOs in
terms of increased grid observability, which allows for voltage
quality enhancement and loss minimization in the LV grid. A
middleware-based architecture has been, shown in Fig. 1, has
been proposed in [2] and used in this work as reference case
study. The ICT Gateway (middleware-layer) provides a uni-
form application platform for domain-oriented applications by
abstracting specific details about provider subsystem interface
into a normalized/harmonized data model and by taking care
of issues related to reliability and security.
In Fig. 1, grid observability applications are shown on the
top, which use measurements and grid topology information
from existing DSO subsystems (shown at the bottom) in order
to calculate and visualize derived metrics such as location of
faults. Since the applications only interact with measurement
and actuation subsystems via the ICT Gateway (ICT GW),
these can be implemented independent of the used subsystems.
The detailed description of complete system architecture is out
Fig. 1: System Architecture for data fusion, adapted from [2]
of the scope of this paper and can be found in [2], while this
work aims at providing an analysis of the ICT GW with respect
to accidental faults and cyber-security.
III. THREAT AND FAULT ANALYSIS TO THE ICT GATEWAY
The identification of potential operability problems is one
of the approaches used when dealing with safety-critical
systems. All the approaches have a common factor, namely the
identification of hazards, which is a real or potential condition
that, when activated, can lead to a series of interrelated events
that result in damage to equipment or property or injury
to people. Fault Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [6],
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [7], Hazard and Operability Studies
(HAZOP) [8] are the most used techniques available for the
identification of hazards.
Although these techniques are usually applied to evaluate
the impact of accidental faults to the system’s safety, this
work aims at applying the HAZOP approach in an unusual
way to analyze in combination both faults and cyber-security
aspects of the ICT GW, which can have impact on the smart
grid operation, through implementation of erroneous actions,
or which can be originated by the HeadEnds of the grid.
A. The Methodology
In order to follow a systematic approach, leading to cover
all potential threats and hazards to the system, the analysis is
based on two aspects: the functions the ICT Gateway has to
perform and the interfaces between DSO’s subsystems with
the ICT Gateway in order to consider the data exchanged.
The threat and hazard identification is based on a HA-
ZOP approach conducted through the application of selected
guidewords to both functions and interfaces. The applica-
tion of guidewords allows systematically identifying potential
deviations from the expected behavior of the system under
analysis. The sets of guidewords for functions and interfaces
are respectively: {NOT, OTHER THAN, REPETITION} and
{NOT, CORRUPTION, DELAY, MISROUTE, EAVESDROP,
SCAN, SPOOF}. Each function and interface of the system is
inspected in turn by applying the guidewords to identify possi-
ble deviations from the normal behavior, thus potential causes
of both accidental faults and intentional acts. The analysis is
recorded and maintained through specific worksheets.
B. Threat and Hazard Risk Evaluation
Once threats and hazards have been identified along with de-
tailed, the risk is evaluated. In order to check the acceptability
of dangerous events, the approach considers the combination
of the severity of the harmful event with its probability. A
threat having serious consequences but whose probability of
occurrence is very weak can be accepted, while a less serious
but more frequent event cannot be accepted. This comparison
is presented through a criticality matrix.
The probability and severity have been assigned on expert
judgment, in a conservative and protective way, thus consider-
ing the worst case, while the probability has to be re-assigned
after identification of proper countermeasures able to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level.
Once the threats have been identified and according to the
results of the Risk analysis, The methodology follows two
different ways based on the risk obtained through the combi-
nation of probability and severity: i) if the risk of the hazardous
event is evaluated as “Negligible” or “Tolerable” then no other
actions are required; ii) if the risk is evaluated as “Intolerable”,
countermeasures useful to prevent the occurrence of the event
or to reduce its probability of occurrence must be identified.
Countermeasures identify long-term strategies that may in-
clude planning, procedures, maintenance activities, utilization
of specific components, equipment, and other technological
solutions able to counteract the undesired event.
C. Analysis Results
The analysis and risk assessment led to identify hazardous
events that need to be addressed to avoid or to prevent system
failure. In the following, relevant results from the analysis are
reported, while the full analysis can be found in [9].
Measurement data for grid observability is a relevant asset to
be safeguarded with respect to faults and cyber-attacks. Fig.2
shows an extract of the analysis of hazardous events identified
by the application of guidewords corruption and delay to
the measurements from a generic HeadEnd to the ICT GW.
Consequences of these events are that problems occurring in
the electrical grid are not promptly addressed (in case of delay,
even worse useless activities of maintenance or setting of the
grid are performed in case of corruption of data, leading to
degradation, instability of the grid, customers’ dissatisfaction,
loss of money. Causes identified range from ICT faults (e.g.,
HW faults, Network congestion/disconnection) to intentional
attacks to the communications (e.g., Man in the Middle, Inter-
ference). The Risk Classification pre-mitigation is Intolerable,
based on Probability and Severity before the identification of
mitigations; while introducing proper mitigations, to lower the
probability of occurrence of the threat, leads to reduce the risk
to a Tolerable level, thus bringing the threat status from Open
to Solved and, after implementation, to Closed.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RELATED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This work discussed the relevance of accessing measure-
ment data from heterogeneous field devices for grid observ-
ability and provided as example a set of analysis results
obtained through the application of a threat and hazard analysis
to the ICT Gateway characterizing the overall system.
In addition to classic mitigations, such as use of fire-
walls, anti-viruses, authentication, encryption protocols, secu-
rity policies, the performed threat and hazard analysis reveals
meaningful research directions that deserve to be further
investigated, as described in the following.
Information freshness in real-time observability applica-
tions: The analysis, as well as other researches in critical
domains [10], highlights the importance for applications that
work in real-time to deal with reliable data from the point
of view of updating. Handling grid scenarios with outdated
or incomplete data could have different impacts. While there
are several quantitative metrics and calculation models to
quantify the impact of communication and information access
delays, existing studies [11], [12] look at probabilistic delay
distributions, without linking those to different root causes; the
results of the hazard analysis enable a top-down identification
of relevant scenarios and root causes.
The approaches in [13] link information age to value errors
in the retrieved data. Value errors however can be caused
by multiple other reasons including: measurement noise, time
alignment errors for measurement intervals that are caused
by imperfect clock deviations [14], faults in the measurement
device or in other components in the measurement subsystems,
malicious attacks on the communication networks. A quanti-
tative investigation of the joint impact of relevant causes of
value errors is interesting future work that can use the hazard
analysis as the starting point to identify the relevant causes.
Anomaly Detection Methods: The analysis draw attention
to corruption of measurement, in particular to the difficulty
to distinguish malicious intentional modifications from mea-
surement errors due to subsystems failures. Several anomaly
detection approaches exist focusing on power consumption
anomalies [15], [16], which anyway do not distinguish be-
tween the causes (either accidental or intentional) of the
deviation from normal expectation.
An interesting direction in order to follow the way of cyber-
security is the joint monitoring of both electrical measurements
and ICT aspects, such as resource usages (e.g., CPU percent-
age usage, memory percentage usage) and communications be-
tween network devices (e.g., number of packets sent/received),
which are usually a symptom of security violations.
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management for dependability of electricity distribution grids: Oppor-
tunities and barriers,” in 2017 13th European Dependable Computing
Conference (EDCC). United States: IEEE, 9 2017, pp. 8 – 9.
[2] Net2DG, “Deliverable d1.2 - initial baseline architecture,” 2018.
[3] G. Dondossola and R. Terruggia, “Security of communications in voltage
control for grids connecting der - impact analysis and anomalous
behaviours,” August 2014.
[4] R. Terruggia and G. Dondossola, Cyber Security Analysis of Smart
Grid Communications with a Network Simulator. Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2015, pp. 153–164.
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Source Destination Data Guideword Threat/Hazard Description Consequence Cause Probability Severity Risk Mitigation/Countermeasure Probability Severity Risk 
flow/lnformation (Pre- (Pre- Classification (Post- (Post- Classification 
Mitigation) Mitigation) (Pre- mitigation) mitigation) (Post-
Mitigation) mitigation) 
HeadEnd ICTGW Measurements CORRUPTION Message is corrupted : - ICT GW does not reply to registration . - Environmental condition Highly Catastrophic Intolerable - Authentication techniques Remote Catastrophic Tolerable 
from the field - the message is not accepted - ICT GW addresses wrong data and event - Interference Probable - Security Policies 
- the message is acceptable but thinking they are correct. - Interruption of data - Maintenance procedures 
wrong transmission - Encryption schema (TLS) 
- Cable disconnection - Error and corruption detection mechanisms 
- SW bug - Anomaly detection 
- HW fault - Intrusion detection 
- Malware 
- Data Injection 
- Man in the Middle 
HeadEnd ICTGW Measurements DELAY Message is delayed during - ICT GW cannot promptly react to events or - SW bug Highly Catastrophic Intolerable - Timestamping Highly Serious Tolerable 
from the field transmission address fresh data. - Huge amount of Data Probable - Authentication Probable 
- Network Congestion - Anomaly detection 
- Network Disconnection 
- Malicious code installed 
Fig. 2: Extract of the analysis from [9]
